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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TH[ STATE OF UTAH

THE STERLING PRESS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
C. L. PETTIT and JOHN SYBROWSKY,
dba INVESTORS PUBLISHING COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
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l
l
l
l
l
l

Case No. 15304

J

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake
County, Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge.

W. Jeffery Fillmore, of
BIELE, HASLA/1 & HATCH
80 \{est Broad~1ay, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent, The Sterling
Press
David H. Day, of
DAY & BARNEY
4924 Pop] ar Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorney for Defendants and Appellant,
C. L. Pettit and John Sybrowsky dba
Investors Publishing Company
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IN THE SUPREME

COU~T

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STERLING PRESS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 15304

vs.

C. L. PETTIT and JOHN SYBROWSKY,
dba INVESTORS PUBLISHING COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEI1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff-Respondent, as payee of a check, seeks recovery
from the makers of their unpaid check.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted Judgment to Plaintiff-Respondent against
Defendants-Appel I ants for the amount of their unpaid check together with
an attorney's fee.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the Judgment of the Trial
Court affirmed.
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STAIEIIEriT OF F!1C T~.

Th2 Plaintiff-Respondent, The2 Sterl inCJ Pr<'"·'·· ("Pl;;irll iff"
hereafter) operates a printing business and printed the magazine,
"The Utah Equestrian", for the Defendants-Appellants, C. L, Pettit
and John Sybr01·1sky ("Defendants" hereafter).

The Defendants signed

and delivered to Plaintiff their check dated January 5, 1974!

as

payment for printing t1~o issues of the Defendant's magazine,

The

check on its face sho·ds it to be drawn on the account of Investors
Publishing Company and it is signed by both Defendants.

The check

does not refer to any corporation nor have the signers shown that
they signed in any representative capacity.
At the time the printing services were rendered and at the
time the check

~tas

given, the Defendants had not registered the trade

names of "Investors Publishing Company" or "The Utah Equestrian".2
The Plaintiff deposited the check and the check was returned without payment because at the time the check was issued and
at a II subsequent times the Defendants did not have any funds in
their bank account with which to pay the check and the bank

3
payment.

refus~

Plaintiff has not been paid for the printing services

represented by the check. 4
The check was issued on January 5, 1974.
menced this action on March 12, 1974.

6

5

P I a i n t i ff com-

Plaintiff forwarded their

!Exhibit P-2; Record pages 13, 16, 18.
2Record page 43.
3Transcript pages 16, 17; Exhibits P-1, P-16.
4Transcript page 16; Record pages 13, 16, 18.
5Exhibit P-2; Record pages 13, 16, 18.
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Re~ucsls for Acl~dss ions to Defendants on Apri I 29, 19711_?

On May

16, 1974 Lhe Defendants filed their certificate with the Secretary
of Statc,'s Office registering the trade name "Investors Publishing
Company" and the trade name "The Utah Equestrian" was never regis8
tered.
The magazine at Page 1 states that it was pub] ished by
Investors Publishing Company, C. L. Pettit, President.9

Inter-

national Land Corporation is not mentioned anywhere in the magazine.

T1·1o real estate ads arpear in the magazine ~lithout mention

of International Land Corporation.

The real estate advertisements

are only two pages out of the fifteen pages of advertising in the
magazine.
The Plaintiff sent its invoices to the Utah Equestrian for
the printing services rendered.

10

The invoices were paid except for

the last two for which the subject check were given.
The two checks that Defendants introduced as evidence of a
corporate payment are dated December 21 and 27, 1972, over one year
.
before the su bJect
c h ec k , an d were payment f or t h e f"1rst tssue. 11
0

Although the Defendants state in their Brief at page 3 that all of the
services were paid for by checks drawn on International Land Corporation, the Defendants did not choose to introduce any additional checks
as supporting evidence, nor is there any testimony of such fact in the
transcript.

?Record page 13.
8Record page 43.
9Exhibit P-3.
lOExhibit
P-1.
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The Plaintiff's officer te<,cifie•' th•t ~,:~
-

J

u

'

-

t

c

c

''''"'J"l he c·ns

de:

ing 1·1ith the individuals and th•c: i r invoices and the c f 1:.:- c~~' ,-e,_e i ved'
gether with the magazine, support his contention that ha
~

l-iaS

tr,.

1'/0r~ing

with the individuals and not with a corporation.12

ARGUI\ENT OF RESPONDEIIT

POINT l
THE DE FENDAriTS ARE PERSOIJALL Y Ll ABLE FOR BUS IIIESS
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED IN A TRADE NNIE
At all

times that the Defendants were doing business c·lith the

Plaintiff, the Defendants had not registered their trade names of "Investors Pub] ishing Co171pany" or "The Utah Equestrian".
The Utah State Legislature has i!71posed the burden upon anyone
transacting business under an assumed name to register the assumed name:
"Every person . • • who shall carry on, conduct or transact business in this State under an assu171ed name, whether
such business be carried on, conducted or transacted as an
individual, association, partnership, corporation or other~lise shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a
certificate setting forth the name.of • • • such business and
the full true • • • names of the • • • persons owning and the ...
persons carrying on, conducting or transacting such business,
the location of the principal place of business and the post
office address of such • • • persons • • • "13
The Statute further makes it a misdeneanor to conduct busines•
without the proper registration.

12Transcript pages 8, 11-15, 18-20, 24.
13sec. 42-2-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
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l

Courts have held that 11herc: persons fa i I
to register a trade
rare, the persons are deemed to be conductin3 the business for and
on
behalf of themsel'les only and not for any other entity and the individuals are personally I iable for the obi igations incurred in the assumed
14
nane.
The Legislature has also imposed personal I iabil ity upon persons who conduct business as a corporation without proper registration.
"All persons ~1ho assume to act as a corporation ~lith
out authority so to do shall be jointly and severally
I iable for all debts and I iabil ities incurred or arising
as a result thereof."l5
This Court in a recent case

16

upheld the above statute and

found personal I iabi I ity against individuals ~1ho were transacting business as a corporation without proper statutory qualification of the
corporation.

In this case the Defendants, at the time they did busi-

ness with the Plaintiff, had not properly qualified their assumed name
either as a corporation itself or as an assumed name of a duly qual ified corporation.
Only after Plaintiff commenced this action did the Defendants
register one of their trade names, Investors Publishing Company!?

This

belated filing was over a year after the Plaintiff commenced business
dealings

~Jith

ject check

~1as

the Plaintiff; was more than four months after the subissued; was more than

t1-1o

months after this action was

14oakason vs. Lisbon Valley Uranium Co., 154 F.Supp. 692;
Putnam vs. Industrial Comm .. 80 U. 187, 14 P.2d 973.
15sec. 16-10-139, U.C.A., 1953, as a171ended.
16Gi II ham Advertising Agency, Inc. vs. lpson, 567 P.2d 163.
17Record page 43.
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commei)Ccd ~

and, \-;as rTJore

than

t1.·;o vh:~k.s uft,~r Pl

,, ·rrl t ·' f'-r h ~u·' subrcittc

their Requ2st for Admissions to the Ccfcndnt rc•:.·,r:lir·rOJ '·
the registr~tion of the trade name.
Tile Plaintiff's officer thought that he:
individuals

13

1·1as

and this \·las corroboruted by the \IJY

billed for the services on its irrvoices. 19

r!'Oal ing . .1 ith

t~2

Plaintiff

The testi:rony in the de·

posit ion of Defendant's witness, Ann Garrett, was only based on her
supposition and not from any clear recollection of the conversation
regarding representative capacity.

She v1as not involved vlith the

management of the Defendants Company, nor \·las she an investor and
had no responsibility for payment of their accounts.

20

Plaintiff's

officer's recollections were of the specific discussions with Defen·
dants of payment for Plaintiff's services.
The Plaintiff was further justified in thinking that it VIas
doing business with individuals because all during the time that the
parties had their business transaction the Secretary of State's Office
had no registration of a trade name or a qualified corporation of the
names used by Defendants.

The documents introduced by the Defendant

as exhibits to prove they were acting on behalf of a corporationVIere
totally irrelevant.

The bank account records are records owned by

the bank and the Plaintiff would have no access to those records.

IBTranscript pages 8, 11-15, 18-20, 24.
I 9Exh i bit P-1 •
20Deposition page 13, 18.
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Th,' PlcJir1lit-f had no access to the: (.(Jr~,(>r,1 te r(>_l)rcl_J of

tional

the

Interna-

LZJn,_l Coqxnalion and I·Jas n0t e\;en (~ntar 2 0 ; tt~ 3 ~ C·::>r~ordtion.

Th~ r:1J~Z12inc itself only refers to the trade naCJe and not to a corpo-

ration.

The tax comMission registration and warrants, bulk nail per-

nits and business I icenses are totally beyorrd the sco;oe of reasonable
inquiry by th~ Plaintiff and most of 11hich were obtained long after
t:1e initial business contract bet1·1een Plaintiff and Defendant.
It vlould be an unreasonable, indeed im~ossible, burden upon
the Plaintiff to make the thorough daily search that Defendant argues
is required to be made to determine whether or not custo-,ers are
either a duly qualified corporation or a duly registered trade name.
Even if this is the burden upon the Plaintiff, the investigation would
not have been fruitful because the various filings of the Defendants
were made over an extended term rather than on one particular day and
were made after Plaintiff started the printing jobs for Defendants.
lt is not incumbent upon persons doing business with another
to make daily checks of numerous sources just to determine whether or
not they are in fact a corporation or a trade name.

The Legislature

established the burden of proper registration upon persons, such as
the Defendants, who seek to hide behind the legislative effect of
doing business as a corporation.

Failure to properly register creates

personal I iabi 1 ity to the Defendants.
The business transaction involved in this case was routine
and was not a large transaction for either party.

Requiring the Plain-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff lo check v11th the Sec1·'tary or' ~t,·Jte or
~

~

is cln unl-e.Jsonab!e burden upon connerce.
simple solution:

0

·1"

'1c.r

'·

~ar

t.

1'"'> every day

Tire Lc·;islature adr,pted a

Register a trade nar1e \·lith the Secretary of State.

The Trial

Judge has completed iscret ion in deternining
.

~-J

h'

I Ch

party is to be believed on disputed evidence and in this action there
is substantial evidence and exhibits in the record to support Plaintiffs contentions and testinony th3t it was dealing \vith individuals
and not with a corporation.

The Trial Judge acted 1·easonab!y in de-

termining that as far as the outside world \·las concerned, the Defendants \vere conducting the business of printing The Utah Equestrian as
individuals and that the Plaintiff thought it \vas dealing v1ith individual s in rendering its printing services and that the Defendants,
therefore, are personally I iable for the indebtedness to Plaintiff.

PO ItJT I I

DEFENDANT MAKERS OF A CHECK WHO DID NOT INDICATE
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE
FOR PAYI·\EfJT OF THE CHECK
The subject check written by the Defendants and

deliver~

to Plaintiff shows that it is dra\·Jn on the account of "Investors
Publishing Company" and that it is signed by each Defendant.

21

The

check does not indicate anywhere on the instrument that the payer is
a trade name or othenvise connected with any other entity.

21Exhibit P-2;

Likewise,

Record pages 13, 15, !6, 18.
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tr 12 rc is no inllication .Jt the signature
citY of the signers, the Defendants.

J

ine of any re:)resentative capa-

The che:k 1.1as issu=d in payment

of t\VO invoices submitted by Plaint iff to Defendants.

\/hen the check

, .1as presented for payment on t1-10 occasions to the dra>~ee bank payment
was refused and Defendants did not have money in the bank account with
which to pay the check. 2 2
The contract of the makers of a check is that they agree to
pay it upon completion of the check, signing it and delivering it to
the payee.

23

Furthermore, the maker of a check implies that he is not

only 1 iable for payment of the check but that the check will be paid
24
upon presentment to the drawee bank.
The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty upon the Defendants to indicate their representative capacity.

By failing to indi-

cate the representative capacity on the subject check the Defendants
become individually 1 iable.

The Code provides at Section 3-403: 25

"(2) An authorized representative who signs his own
name to an instrument:
(a) is personally obi igated if the instrument
neither names the person represented nor shows
that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the
immediate parties, is personally obligated if
the instrument names the person represented but
does not show that the representative signed
any representative capacity • . • "

22Record pages 13, 16, 18; Exhibits P-16, P-2.
23sec. 70A-3-413, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
24Pollin vs. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. 87, 236 A.2d 542
(1967); Riley vs. First State Bank, 469 S.l4.2d 812 (Texas 1971).
25sec. 70A-3-403, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
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The only indication of re!)resentative c1pacity
is the n,lme "Investors Pub] ishing Co:'l'oany''.
'"'

11

0

n

t

h
e chec'

h
Ol'lever, t e Defcndunts

had not registered any such entity nacoe so that the Plaintiffs could
not have kno1m that the Defendants ,.,"reacting in a repres<C.ntative
capacity.

As previously discussed under Point

of this Brief, th~re

is substantial competent evidence to support the Trial Court's determination that the Plaintiffs believed they 1·1<cre conducting business

1~ith individuals and that the Plaintiff did not knov1 that the Defendants were acting in a representative capacity.
Because the Defendants did not indicate on their check that
they ~¥ere signing as a representative, the Plaintiffs acted reasonably
in relying on the check and in believing they 1·1ere conducting business
with individuals.
The Defendants could easily have indicated any representative
capacity on the check by merely 11riting their title or agency relation·
ship.

The failure of the Defendants to state their representative cap-

acity on the check or othenlise establish that they \)ere an agent of
another entity for the effect of making the check their personal check
and, therefore, they are 1 iable personally for its payment.26

POl NT Ill
DEFEtlDAriTS

ARE LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Defendants issued their check to Plaintiff in payment of
the printing services.

The printing services \•Jould not have been

260. P. Ganjo, Inc. vs. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super.
517, 261 A.2d. 722 ( 1969); Industrial Finance Co. vs. Lovel;
9 Hash. App. 829, 515 P.2d. 1304 (1973). See similar holdSponsored by the S.J. Quinneyings
Law Library.
Funding forcited
digitizationin
provided
by the Institute
of cases
footnote
24.of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rcnckn·d 1.ithoul the delivery of the chr2ck.27
by th2 oa11c

The

ch~ck

11as not paid

b·.>causc of lack of funds in t:le account on ,.1hich it c1as

drc:nm ilnd th·' check 1-1as returned to the Piaintiffs. 23

The Plaintiff

contacted the Defendants by telephone and by personal visit after the
check 1·1as returned and the Defendants told th~ Plaintiff that the
check 1vould be paid upon further presentment and to redeposit the
check.

29

The Plaintiff redeposited the check and it was returned un-

paid a second time by the drawee bank.30

Neither the check nor the

account for the printing services has been paid.
The Plaintiff has met the burdens of proof set forth in
Chapter 15 of Title 7 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and the Court found,
under the statute, that the Defendants issued the checks to the Plaintiff for the value of the printing services so that Plaintiff would
render the printing services and that the check was drawn on an account in 1·1hich there were not sufficient funds to pay the check.

The

Plaintiff gave notice to the Defendant that the initial deposit had
not been paid and thereafter, the Defendants made no attempt to either
have the check paid or made any additional deposits to the account with
which to pay the check.
The statute provides the basis for the Court to find that the
check was issued and delivered wilfully ~olith the intent to defraud the

~Transcript pages l 2' 13, l 5.
2 Transcript page l 6.
2 9Transcript pages 16, 17.
30Transcript page 17; Exhibit P-2.

2
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Plainliff.

There is ar1plc evidence in th':'. record froe1 c)hich tn 2

CGJc·

found thal Plaintiff is entitled under the stat u t e t o an a"ard of ac
attorney's fee.

COtlCLUS I 0:1
The Defendants' business dealings vlith the Plaintiff \·Jere
personal and the obi igations incurred in the transactions are personal 1 iabil ities of the Defendants.

The Defendants failed to Pro-

perly register the assumed name under v1hich they claim they were doins
business and they failed to indicate any representative

capacity~

Plaintiff in its business dealings or on the check issued.

The check

was issued against an account in v1hich there v1ere not sufficient funds
to pay the check.

The Defendants are personally I iable, as the Trial

Court found, for the ar:1ount of the check together 1vith interest, a
reasonable attorney's fee and the costs incurred.

The Trial Court

judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

W. JEFFERY FILLMORE, of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
80 \1est Broadc-1ay, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent, The Sterling Press
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